Reference: Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar’s open letter to Nandan Nilekani in the Times of India, July 5, 2009 (http://epaper.timesofindia.com - Follow instructions there. Go to Bangalore edition of Sunday Times, July 5, 2009. Choose the 'All that matters' section).
Dear Nandan Nilekani,
This is one techie to another.
After reading Swaminathan’s open letter to you, I am beginning to feel sorry for the unholy mess you have bravely cast yourself into. Ofcourse, some of Swami’s concerns cannot and should not be addressed by you (an example being whether the ruling parties of West Bengal and Assam will actually use the smartcards to check illegal immigration – there is nothing you can do about that). At the same time, some of his other concerns certainly apply to your scope of work.
I have some suggestions . I know you are much more capable and experienced, and can think up all the necessary solutions. Besides, I am no expert in these matters, and some of my suggestions may be unworkable. But I believe a bit of open brainstorming can help.
1) Please run your outfit in private industry style. It should be performance driven, with NO job guarantees. At the same time, remuneration should be commensurate with private industry standards, with metrics-driven bonuses. If the GoI insists that your organization must follow Government employment rules with cushy job guarantees and Government pay scales, ask them to go take a hike, and return back to Infy.
2) Link multiple biometric data (retina, voice print, thumb print) as well as facial and full length photographs to a single smart card. This might increase the cost a bit, but it will also make it a bit more foolproof. The costs can be reduced by high-volume orders for biometric equipment, and intelligent tailoring of the data acquisition process.
3) Use two data entry operators to process entries for a single card. If one of the operators makes a mistake, the system can raise a red flag. This will increase accuracy, and reduce voter-ID style goof-ups.
4) The data base should also maintain records of the officials involved in issuing a given smart card. Post-issuance, the system should randomly choose some citizen IDs for a double check process. Vigilance officers will go out into the field do a check. If the biometric data/photographs associated with a smart card is found to be false, it will be followed up by initiation of punitive action against the issuing officials, and a bonus for the vigilance officers. I know this is beginning to sound somewhat draconian. But I am not talking about falsification of other records like address, etc, where the poor officials may sometimes get fooled by the applicant. I am talking about hard biometric data and photographs which are equipment-acquired. Also, error rates for biometric methods (FAR, FMR, EER,etc) should be taken into consideration here. Since a combination of biometric methods will be used, it will be easier to handle individual error rates.
5) Privacy: Please ensure very strict measures are adopted for protecting the privacy of the biometric data. If possible, use cancellable biometrics. This involves storing a controlled distortion of the biometric data. Even if it is leaked, it can be replaced. Refer to the following: N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell, and R. M. Bolle, "Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems," IBM systems Journal, vol. 40, pp. 614-634, 2001.
New edit: I am not suggesting storing the biometric data on the smart card. That would be far too dangerous. Rather, just some primary information like ID number, facial photograph, database linker tokens,etc should be stored on the smart card.
